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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

NIC 00997-86 26 February 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA:

National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM:

Assistant National Intelligence Officer for

Latin America

SUBJECT:

Latin America Warning and Forecast Meeting

February 1986

1. The following items were discussed at the Intelligence Community's Warning and Forecast Meeting held on 19 February 1986.

Haiti

- 2. The collapse of the Duvalier government has renewed the hopes of several radical leftist exile groups who are now planning to return to Haiti to rebuild their organizations. Among the groups involved, the following are the more likely to pose a problem for the interim government and its successor:
 - -- Unifed Party of Haitian Communists (PUCH) with perhaps 100-300 members. It may have a few cells lefts in Haiti, but the overwhelming majority of its members are in exile, mostly in the Dominican Republic. Its Secretary General, Rene Theodore, lives in Paris and the Central Committee is in Mexico. In the past it has proven to be inept. Cuba has provided support to the group for several years.
 - -- Hector Riobe Brigade, with perhaps 40 members, has ties to Cuba and the PLO.
 - -- Democratic Force for the Liberation of Haiti (FDLH), led by Bernard Sansaricq, has ties to Libya, the USSR, and the PUCH. It claims to have a cadre that was trained in Libya.
 - -- Haitian Workers Party, a Marxist group whose strength is unknown.

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Some groups already may have begun their infiltration back into the country. The Dominican Communist Party (PCD) has been serving as Cuba's principal link to PUCH representatives, most of whom are in the Dominican Republic. Many of these are more radical than their Secretary-General, Rene Theodore, who has demonstrated no great urgency to get back to Haiti. Members of the Dominican Communist Party who have recently returned home from combat duty in El Salvador have offered to provide the PUCH with military training.

Cuba has begun to press PUCH leaders to return to Haiti and appears willing to continue supporting this group. After the PUCH, the Haitian Workers Party shows the most potential. With inducements and pressure Cuba might bring about some cooperation among the disparate exile elements. There is no information to indicate that Libya has made any effort to exploit the situation.

In the past, these leftist groups have had little popular support since the average Haitian was severely intimidated by the Volunteers for National Security (VSN). With the dissolution of the VSN the old restraints are gone, and leftist organizers may find the situation in Haiti more conducive or at least less forbidding. For the near term the radical leftist groups do not pose a threat to the government. In the longer term their chances may improve. This will be determined, to some extent, by the amount of resources Cuba is willing to provide the PUCH and others.

WARNING ISSUE: Will the Haitian radical left, with the assistance of Cuba or Libya, try to exploit the volatile situation that may develop in the coming months? Do they have the capability of becoming more than an irritant or minor problem?

<u>Nicaragua</u>

3. The Nicaraguan political opposition has lowered its visibility in recent months as a result of increasingly harsh repression. It continues to exist and test Sandinista tolerance whenever it thinks it can do so with a degree of safety. At times the Sandinistas even indicate that it is to their advantage to keep the political opposition from disappearing completely. In recent months the leadership of the opposition has felt increasingly isolated with less and less access to the media. Leadership of the movement, which has rarely been strong, has turned to increased backbiting and lack of cooperation.

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	Any appreciable increase in the Pevel of the insurgency will probably lead to an increase in reprisals against the political opposition by the Sandinistas. For now, however, the opposition's position might best be described as one of no immediate signs of collapsing nor of accommodation but with little prospect for any significant upswing in activity. WARNING ISSUE: Has the political opposition been intimidated and repressed to the point where it is in danger of disappearing as a	
	significant participant on the Nicaraguan political scene? Will this occur in response to increased insurgent activity?	0EV4
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Participating in the NIO/Latin America Warning Meeting of 19 February 1986 were representatives of the following agencies:

INR/IAA/Department of State

DIA:

DIO/DIA DIAC/DE-3 DIAC/DB3C1 DIAC/DB3C3 DIAC/DB4E DIA/DB6 JSI-4B AT-5

National Security Agency

US Marines Corps/INTP

CIA Participants:

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